Wade, Elizabeth, & Herbert H. Clark
  1993   Reproduction and demonstration in quotations. *Journal of Memory and Language* 32: 805–819.

Two Dogmas on Quotation[*]

Jürgen Pafel

1.   Introduction

It seems quite obvious that pure quotations are singular terms. In sentences like *'Dogma' is a noun of Greek and Latin origin* the subject of the sentence obviously is a singular term denoting a certain word. This use of pure quotations is a quite frequent one. Surprisingly, one should not conclude from this fact that pure quotations syntactically are noun phrases and semantically singular terms denoting linguistic expressions, as is done quite unanimously in the literature on quotation.[1] Carefully looking at pure quotations' syntactic distribution sug-

---

[*] I am especially indebted to Philippe De Brabanter, Elke Brendel, Fabian Dirscherl, Manuel García-Carpintero and Jörg Meibauer for interesting discussions in the context of my presentation with the same title at the 'First International Conference on Quotation and Meaning' in Mainz, 19 october 2007, and, last not least, to Markus Steinbach for his very helpful comments on the manuscript.

1. "[T]ake quotation marks: applied to any sort of expression, what they produce is a singular term (naming [...] the expression inside)" (Quine 1960: 143). "It is clear that quotations are noun phrases, as they function as grammatical subjects" (Saka 1998: 119). "[Closed] quotation functions as a singular term within the mentioning sentence" (Recanati 2001: 651). "[T]he semantic function of [pure and direct quotation] [...] is to be a singular term" (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 60). "[P]ure quotations are always NPs" (Cappelen and Lepore 2007: 138). "[Pure quotation] can be understood as governed by a simple semantic principle, apparently first identified by Tarski (1933): by enclosing any expression within quotation marks one gets a singular term – a quotation – that stands for (refers to, denotes) the enclosed expression" (Gómez-Torrente 2005: 129). "On the demonstrative theory, neither the quotation as a whole (quotes plus filling) nor the filling alone is, except by accident, a singular term. The singular term is the quotation marks, which may be read 'the expression a token of which is here'" (Davidson 1979 [1984: 90]). "Still, we can retain the essentials of Davidson's theory, while rejecting his treatment of the quotation marks as a singular term. The quotation marks merely indicate that the quoted words are being demonstrated. It is, I suggest, the demonstration itself which assumes the function of a singular term, in closed quotation" (Recanati 2001: 655).

gests something else: pure quotations definitely have the distribution of nouns, not of noun phrases. (Sentences like the one above should be compared to sentences where the subject noun phrase visibly contains a noun only, as is the case, for instance, in sentences with proper names: *Quine was an extraordinary philosopher*.) This distributional fact has semantic consequences: one cannot cope with the entire distribution of pure quotations if one takes them semantically as singular terms. Instead, their distribution suggests a predicate view on pure quotations, as nouns usually are predicates. Pure quotations, as we will see, are predicates whose meaning is *to have a certain shape*, with the shape being that which the pure quotation presents in between the quotations marks. This is a kind of self-reference as the meaning of such a noun makes reference to its shape and accounts for the picture-like character of pure quotations.

There is a second, quite wide-spread assumption, a second ›dogma‹, which is not as obviously true as one might initially be tempted to think, namely, the assumption that pure and direct quotations are more or less on a par with each other, as far as syntax and semantics is concerned.[2] In combination with the first dogma one gets the apparently obvious conclusion that direct quotes are noun phrases and singular terms denoting linguistic expressions.[3] Carefully comparing the distribution of pure and direct quotations exhibits, as we will see, significant differences. Direct quotations have the distribution of clauses, not the distribution of noun phrases or nouns. This syntactic difference suggests a semantic difference. As (argument) clauses normally denote propositions, one should have conclusive evidence at hand for direct quotations differing from normal clauses, i.e., for direct quotations denoting linguistic expressions. On the contrary, there is evidence that they do denote propositions, which suggests an analysis of direct quotes as a special kind of definite description of propositions. The self-referential character of direct quotation is, exactly like the pure quotation's, a consequence of its meaning, which makes reference to the quo-

---

2. See most of the quotes in footnote 1.
3. "Wenn man in der gewöhnlichen Weise Worte gebraucht, so ist das, wovon man sprechen will, deren Bedeutung. Es kann aber auch vorkommen, daß man von Worten selbst [...] reden will. Jenes geschieht z.B., wenn man die Worte eines anderen in gerader Rede anführt. Die eigenen Worte bedeuten dann zunächst die Worte des anderen, und erst diese haben die gewöhnliche Bedeutung. Wir haben dann Zeichen von Zeichen. In der Schrift schließt man in diesem Falle die Wortbilder in Anführungszeichen ein. Es darf also ein in Anführungszeichen stehendes Wortbild nicht in der gewöhnlichen Bedeutung genommen werden" (Frege 1892: 28).

tation's shape. After looking at several kinds of quotations, the diverse uses of quotations marks present themselves as a case of polysemy.[4]

2.   The syntax of pure quotation

I begin with presenting some examples illustrating the variety of uses of pure quotations in languages like English, French, Polish and German. I confine myself to English and German examples. In (1) we probably have the most frequent use of pure quotations with the pure quotation being the one and only visible element of a noun phrase.[5]

(1)   a.   'Dogma' ist ein Nomen mit griechischem und lateinischem Ursprung.
       b.   'Dogma' is a noun of Greek and Latin origin.

In these cases the pure quotation behaves like a noun phrase even if it is a sentence which is quoted. See the English examples in (2) and (3). The quotation can fill the subject position of the clause (see (2a)), but the quotation cannot be extraposed (see (2b)). The subject clause in (3b), however, can be extraposed.

(2)   a.   'That two plus two equals four' is a dependent clause.
       b.   *It is a dependent clause 'that two plus two equals four'.
(3)   a.   That two plus two equals four is always true.
       b.   It is always true that two plus two equals four.

Similarly, the pure quotation in German can be located sentence-internally (more precisely, in the ›mittelfeld‹ of the German sentence), but not at the right end of the sentence in an extraposed position (see (4a) vs. (4b,c)). A subject, or an argument, clause, however, can hardly be located sentence-internally. Its most natural position is the extraposed one (see (5)).[6]

---

4. For descriptive reasons, I use distinct quotation marks for the diverse kinds of quotation: 'pure quotes', "direct quotes", »mixed quotes«, ›scare quotes‹.
5. There are languages where a pure quotation cannot stand alone as the subject of a sentence, where it must be introduced by a determiner. Swabian, a dialect in the south-west of Germany, is such a language.
   (i)   *(des) 'le' dud dr Schwob fascht iberall dröhenge.
          the 'le' does the Swabian almost everywhere add
          'The Swabian can add 'le' to almost every word.'
6. It is generally the case that German subject and object clauses prefer the extraposed position at the right end of a clause. Only under very special conditions can they be located sentence-internally in the mittelfeld. Being topical seems to be one decisive

(4)   a.   Doch ist 'Es regnet' ein deutscher Satz.
          however is 'it rains' a German sentence
     b.   *Doch ist ein deutscher Satz 'Es regnet'.
          however is a German sentence 'it rains'
     c.   *Da (es) ein deutscher Satz ist 'Es regnet', ...
          as (it) a German sentence is 'it rains'

(5)   a. $^?$Doch ist, dass es regnet, eine Tatsache.[7]
          however is that it rains a fact
     b.   Doch ist es eine Tatsache, dass es regnet.
          however is it a fact that it rains
     c.   Da es eine Tatsache ist, dass es regnet, ...
          as it a fact is that it rains

Apart from pure quotations being the one and only visible element of a noun phrase, there are uses of pure quotations with additional elements in the noun phrase. In (6) and (7), for instance, the pure quotation is located in the position where the noun is located in a noun phrase: determiner and adjective in front of the quotation, PP-attributes behind. The noun phrase which contains the pure quotation can be a referential (see (6)), a quantificational (see (7)) or a predicational one (see (9)). As seen in (8), pure quotations can be found in places where so-called narrow appositions are located. Pure quotations can even be part of compounds, see (9) and (10).

(6)   Auf Balzacs Spazierstockgriff: Ich breche alle Hindernisse. Auf meinem: Mich brechen alle Hindernisse. Gemeinsam ist das 'alle'. (Franz Kafka)
      'On the stock of Balzac's walking-stick: "I surmount all obstacles." On mine: "All obstacles surmount me." They have the 'all' in common.'

(7)   a.   In jedem seiner Sätze kommen mindestens zwei 'natürlich' vor.
          'In each one of his sentences, he uses 'of course' at least twice.'

---

condition as the following well-formed example of Webelhuth (1992: 103ff.) suggests (cf. Meinunger 2000: 183):

(i)   Weil ich, dass Hans krank ist, nicht glauben kann.
     as I that John ill is not believe can
     'As I can't believe that John is ill.'

I conducted a litte corpus study with the result that, as for one edition of the weekly paper *Die Zeit* (7 august 2008), there was not one case with a (finite or non-finite) argument clause sentence-internally. All argument clauses were extraposed (the majority) or located at the left edge of the sentence.

7.   It is difficult to determine the correct level of (5a)'s unacceptability.

---

     b.   His speech abounded in many I think so's. (Cf. Clark and Gerrig 1990: 771f.)

(8)   a.   Die Präposition 'vor' regiert den Dativ.
          'The preposition 'vor' governs the dative.'
     b.   The preposition 'at' selects a noun phrase as a complement.

(9)   a.   'Vor der Tür' ist eine PP, eine 'vor'-PP.
          "Vor der Tür' is a PP, a 'vor' PP.'
     b.   'At the door' is a PP, it is an 'at' PP.

(10) a.   Und jetzt kommt wieder der 'Keine Macht den Drogen'-Schmarrn. (Cf. Meibauer 2003)
          'And now there is this 'No power to drugs' nonsense again.'
     b.   The I-told-you-so phase of the Iraq invasion is thankfully ending. (*New York Times*)
     c.   These are not 'I really should' radishes. (Clark and Gerrig 1990: 771f.)
     d.   Er verwendete wieder das Herabsetzungs-'du'.
          'He once again used the downgrading 'du'.'

A closer look at the distributional syntax of pure quotations thus reveals that pure quotations have the distribution of nouns, but not the distribution of noun phrases. This suggests that pure quotations literally are nouns. Sentence (7b) is quite instructive in this respect: here the pure quotation is pluralized, which is a clear piece of morphological evidence for it being a noun. As for German, it is obvious from the choice of the article (*das*) that pure quotations are neuter nouns (see (6)). In English, the pronoun *one* can replace nouns as well as pure quotations (*The first 'all' and the second one*). If, as I will assume, pure quotations are nouns, then the syntactic properties, especially the syntactic category, of the quoted material is of no importance to the syntax of pure quotations (the sentences in (2) to (10) are ample evidence for this).

Thus, the view of pure quotations as nouns copes with their entire distribution. The case where pure quotations are the one and only visible element of a noun phrase is a case where the noun phrase visibly only consists of a noun. This is nothing peculiar. Well-known uses of indefinite noun phrases as well as proper names are cases of the same type, a noun phrase visibly only consisting of a noun. Assuming a DP-analysis of noun phrases, I will assume a non-visible determiner ($[_D \emptyset]$) as the head of the noun phrase whose complement is the pure quotation (an analogous assumption is quite common with respect to proper names and certain uses of indefinite noun phrases).

(11) a.   [DP [D this] [N noun]]
      b.   [DP [D ∅] [N nouns]]
      c.   [DP [D ∅] [N Quine]]
      d.   [DP [D ∅] [N 'dogma']]

The distribution facts we just looked at throw doubt at least on the syntactic side of the assumption that pure quotations are noun phrases and singular terms. But the semantic side of the assumption becomes questionable as well. It seems obvious that in the cases where the pure quotation is visibly a proper part of the noun phrase – i.e., where there is an overt determiner, an adjective or a prepositional phrase accompanying the quotation – it cannot be a singular term. In such cases, the quotations should be what nouns generally are, namely, predicates. Thus, the wide-spread assumption in question cannot cope semantically with these cases, and leads to an asymmetry in the use of pure quotations. A symmetric account, in contrast, would be one which treats pure quotations syntactically as nouns and semantically as predicates throughout. One could call it 'the predicate view of pure quotations'. If such an account could sensibly be developed it would be superior to the asymmetric account. This is what I will try to do in § 4 on the basis of Pafel (2007).

There are striking similarities between pure quotations and proper nouns, syntactically as well as semantically. Both are parts of noun phrases, both can have the status of singular terms, but they can also be combined with determiners, adjectives, post-nominal PPs and can be narrow appositions as well as part of compounds.

(12) a.   Quine died in 2000.
      b.   the Quine of *Word and Object*
      c.   the philosopher Quine
      d.   a Quine reader

Assuming that proper nouns are singular terms, we have difficulties in coping with their use as a proper part of a noun phrase. Instead, the distribution suggests a predicate view of proper nouns (cf. Burge 1973, Larson and Segal 1995, Katz 2001, Bach 2002, Elugardo 2002, Karnowski and Pafel 2005). We will come back to these similarities between pure quotations and proper nouns at the end of § 4.

3.   The syntax of direct and mixed quotation

I have already alluded to the fact that in German, argument noun phrases and argument clauses have distinct distribution. Whereas argument noun phrases can be located in the mittelfeld and can be extraposed under special circumstances only (cf. (13)), it is just the other way around with respect to argument clauses: they are most naturally extraposed and can be placed sentence-internally under special circumstances only.

(13) a.   Heine hat das gesagt.   b.   *Heine hat gesagt das.
           Heine has that said   Heine has said that
(14) a.   Heine hat gesagt, dass Moritz ihm der liebste sei.
      b.   ?Heine hat, dass Moritz ihm der liebste sei, gesagt.
           'Heine said that he likes Moritz most.'

These facts provide us with a test concerning the syntactic category of direct quotations. The result is that the direct quotation of a sentence behaves syntactically like a sentence. It can be placed in positions where an argument clause can, thus it can be extraposed and topicalized (see (15), (16), (17)). Parentheticals (out of quote) can be inserted into direct quotations in the same way in which they can be inserted into ordinary sentences (see (18a,b) and (19a,b)). It is questionable whether direct quotations can be used sentence-internally at all (see (20)) – it might be possible, however, under special circumstances.

(15) a.   Heine hat gesagt "Moritz ist mir der liebste".
      b.   Heine said "I like Moritz most".
(16) a.   "Moritz ist mir der liebste" soll Heine gesagt haben.
      b.   "I like Moritz most," Heine is assumed to have said.
(17) a.   Dass Heine gesagt haben soll "Moritz ist mir der liebste", war mir neu.
      b.   That Heine said "I like Moritz most" was new to me.
(18) a.   "Moritz", hat Heine gesagt, "ist mir der liebste."
      b.   "I," said Heine, "like Moritz most".
(19) a.   "Moritz ist mir", hat Heine gesagt, "der liebste."
      b.   "I like," said Heine, "Moritz most".
(20) ?Heine hat "Moritz ist mir der liebste" gesagt.[8]
      Heine has "I like Moritz most" said

---

8. Comparable to (5a), it is difficult to determine the correct level of (20)'s unacceptability.

It is not possible to modify a direct quotation in the same way as a pure quotation by adding, for instance, a determiner and an adjective in front of the quotation or PP-attributes behind.[9]

(21)   a.   *Heine hat gesagt das überraschende "Moritz ist mir der liebste".
       b.   *Heine said the surprising "I like Moritz most".

Thus, direct quotations differ significantly from pure quotations with respect to syntax. Direct quotations seem to be syntactically transparent insofar as their syntactic category is the same as the category of the quoted material. Direct quotations seem to be sentences, not noun phrases.

With totally different, for the most part, semantic considerations, Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 145f.) come to the same conclusion: "It may be that we cannot treat direct quotations as NPs."[10] They stipulate a quotation marker Q which adjoins to syntactic categories of any kind converting them into quotation expressions of the same syntactic category (ibid. 138). In direct quotation it adjoins to an expression of the category S converting it into a quotation expression of the same category. Such a move copes with the syntactic behavior of direct quotations (but see below for the application of this marker to mixed quotations).

Are all direct quotations quotations of sentences? It might be so, as there is evidence that even direct quotations of elliptical constructions should be analyzed as quotations of elliptical sentences. Take a question-answer pair like *Gehst du normalerweise vor Mitternacht ins Bett? In aller Regel ja* 'Do you go to bed before midnight? Usually I do so' (a word-to-word translation of *in aller Regel ja* is 'in every rule yes'). Reporting the answer we might construct the following sentences:

(22)   a.   Sie hat mir geantwortet: "In aller Regel ja"
       b.   "In aller Regel ja", hat sie mir geantwortet.
       c.   ?Sie hat mir "In aller Regel ja" geantwortet.

---

9. In languages like Swabian where a pure quotation must be accompanied by a determiner (cf. footnote 5), direct quotations come without determiner and cannot be combined with it.
   (i)   De Bienzle hot gsagd (*des) "Mi geht des nix ō".
         'Bienzle said "This is of no concern to me".'
10. Their argument, however, is unconvincing, as the argument could successfully be applied to pure quotations too and would show that pure quotations (being the one and only visible element of a noun phrase) could not be noun phrases. See below § 5.

The elliptical answer exhibits the distribution of an argument clause. Assuming that it is an argument clause would immediately explain its distribution. See also the possibility of inserting parentheticals:

(23)   "In aller Regel", antwortete sie, "ja".

But note that the one-word answer *Ja* 'Yes' behaves like a noun phrase in a speech report – we seem to have a pure-quotation use here:

(24)   a.   ?Sie hat geantwortet 'Ja'.
       b.   'Ja' hat sie geantwortet.
       c.   Sie hat 'Ja' geantwortet.
            'She answered 'Yes'.'

Mixed quotations are syntactically transparent too: they smoothly fit into the syntactic context as if there were no quotations.

(25)   Quine says that quotation »has a certain anomalous feature«.
(26)   Er berichtet in seiner Autobiographie darüber, »daß auch in Berlin das gewaltige Ereignis« der Französischen Revolution »große Teilnahme erregte« und die »meisten jungen Männer sich offen zugunsten der Revolution« aussprachen, bis die Ermordung Ludwigs XVI. die Stimmung umschlagen ließ. (De Bruyn 2006: 17)[11]

Example (26) is especially illuminating in this respect. Delete the quotation marks and you get a well-formed sentence. But the linguistic material that is put in quotation marks does not always seem to be a well-formed constituent: Firstly, *daß auch in Berlin das gewaltige Ereignis* is not a sensible constituent of the sentence, as the attribute of *Ereignis* ('event') – namely, *der Französischen Revolution* 'of the French revolution' – is not part of the quotation (only categorial grammarians here might disagree). Secondly, *meisten jungen Männer sich offen zugunsten der Revolution* cannot be a constituent either, as the article *die* is not part of the quotation despite the fact that the article (*die*) and the adjective (*meisten*) are a lexicalized syntactic unit (comparable to *many a* in English with the opposite order of article and adjective). Compare Cumming (2005), who stresses the fact that mixed quotations can quote non-constituents.

---

11. Translation: "In his autobiography, he reported »that even in Berlin, the huge event« of the French revolution »aroused great sympathy« and many »a young men« spoke »frankly in favour of the revolution«, until the killing of Louis XVI radically changed the mood."

Non-constituency in mixed quotation militates heavily against Cappelen and Lepore's quotation marker Q, which they introduced in mixed quotations and transfered to direct quotations (see above), as Q adjoins to arbitrary ›constituents‹ of a sentence in their account.

Scare quotes are syntactically transparent too. Take an ironic statement like *He invited the ›best actress in the world‹*, where the speaker conveys the meaning that someone other than himself takes the invited person for the best actress in the world. The scare quote fits smoothly into its syntactic context as if there were no quotation. The same is true with the well-known examples *These are indeed ›subliminable‹ ads* and *I am not a ›philtosopher‹*. The misshapen words behave like an ordinary adjective resp. noun, just as the intended words do.

The facts looked at in this paragraph throw into doubt the syntactic part of the second dogma, namely, the assumption that pure and direct quotation are more or less on a par with each other, as far as syntax and semantics are concerned. The assumption that direct quotations are noun phrases cannot be upheld. In § 7 we will see reasons to doubt the semantic side of the second dogma.

4.   The predicate view of pure quotations

As pure quotations are nouns, one should assume that they semantically are predicates, as nouns usually are. This has the immediate consequence that all the accounts cannot be on the right track which assign pure quotations the semantics of a singular term.[12] This has, in addition, the consequence that referential noun phrases whose one and only visible element is a pure quotation cannot be semantically unstructured, there must be an additional element which leads to the referential interpretation of the noun phrase.

But let us look at the meaning of the pure-quotation predicate first. As in *'Dogma' is a noun of Greek and Latin origin* the subject denotes a certain word, the pure-quotation predicate should denote a concept which this word satisfies. Which aspect of the word will probably be picked up by this concept? It seems obvious that it is the form aspect of the word, its shape, which is picked up. Now it is near at hand to assume that pure quotations are predicates whose meaning is *to have a certain shape*, with the shape being that, which the pure quotation presents, which is enclosed in quotation marks. Pure quotations are predicates which refer to a certain part of the quotation, namely the graphical

entity enclosed in quotation marks. The pure quotation of the noun *dogma*, for instance, has the meaning displayed in (27).

(27)   *'dogma'* means *to have the shape <dogma>*

The letters 'd', 'o', 'g', 'm' and 'a' enclosed with angle brackets denote a sequence of letters, ›graphs‹. Note that, for instance, the difference between small und capital letters can be a relevant difference in shape – cf. *He didn't write 'dogma' on the wall, but 'DoGmA'*.[13]

How is reference to the shape achieved? I don't think that we need demonstration here, as is often assumed following Davidson (1979). It might be enough to make use of what is generally part of lexical entries in the mental lexicon. A lexical entry minimally contains the idiosyncratic features of an expression, i.e., those of its features which cannot be predicted on the basis of general linguistic rules. Among those features there is at least a description of the phonetic or graphical elements the expression consists of and a description of its meaning. The crucial idea is that, as far as the lexical entry of pure quotations is concerned, the semantic description makes use of the phonetic or graphical description. The lexical entry for pure quotations in (28) consists of three parts: a graphical description (GRAPH), a syntactic (SYN) and a semantic one (SEM).

(28)   Lexical entry for pure quotations with quotation marks:

GRAPH $^*\alpha^*$

with (i) α being a graphical entity and (ii) with * and * staying for ' resp. ', " resp. ", » resp. «, › resp. ‹, " resp. " or similiar things.

SYN   N

SEM   predicate(x,α)

$\lambda x[x$ has shape $\alpha]$

The graphical description describes the graphical form of the expression: an arbitrary graphical entity α is enclosed with quotation marks. There is the syntactic information that the lexical element is a noun (as for German, we would add the gender feature neuter) and the semantic information that it is a two-place predicate with the meaning *x has shape* α. The crucial point is that we make use of the variable α – a variable for graphical entities – not only in the graphical description, but also in the semantic description of the lexical entry.

---

12. One of the latest versions of such an account is Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 124), who propose the schema ' *'e' * ' *quotes 'e'* as the semantic rule for quotation.

13. As for quotation in spoken language, word and sentence accent, syllable boundaries and other prosodic phenomena can be relevant beside segmental properties (cf. *'KONstanz' is the correct pronounciation of the name of the city in the south of Germany, not 'KonSTANZ'*).

Thereby, a pure-quote noun makes reference to one aspect of itself, its shape. (In § 5 we will modify this account a bit.)

In working with such a lexical entry, nothing peculiar has to be stipulated. The fact that a variable is shared by different parts of a lexical entry (»structure sharing«) is something which is very common in theories which are working with elaborated lexical entries, theories like Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar, for instance (see Pollard and Sag 1994: 19, Müller 2008: § 2.4).

The lexical entry in (28) is not the entry of a certain word, but a template, i.e., a lexical entry for a class of words. Templates of this kind are well-known in morphology, especially in wordbased morphology. With this in mind, we could call the process of construing pure quotations a generalized conversion. This is even clearer in cases where pure quotation comes without quotation marks. In that case, a lexical entry like (29) is at hand (we could combine (28) and (29) into one entry by allowing in PHON/GRAPH that, with respect to *α*, * and ° can be left empty).

(29)   Lexical entry for pure quotations without quotation marks:
     PHON/GRAPH α
     SYN   N
     SEM   predicate(x,α)
                     $\lambda x[x \text{ has shape } \alpha]$

When a noun phrase visibly only contains a pure quotation, it is a singular term, a rigid designator. This is beyond doubt.[14] However, if we are right, such a singular term is not semantically unstructured, it has a predicate as a proper part. We, therefore, need an additional semantic element that is responsible for the referential feature. This is the definite description operator (ι) which is defined as follows. The operator in combination with a predicate $(\iota x[\phi x])$ is a referential term to denote the entity that is maximal with respect to F, the property of being the most salient entity which satisfies the predicate (i.e., the entity that has property F and has all entities as parts which have property F).[15]

---

14. "A designator d of an object x is rigid, if it designates x with respect to all possible worlds where x exists, and never designates an object other than x with respect to any possible world" (Kripke in a letter to Kaplan – see Kaplan 1989). The quotation in the embedded clause (i) denotes exactly the same as what the quotation in *'Dogma' is a noun of Greek and Latin origin* denotes, namely, the lexem 'dogma'.
   (i)   It is possible that 'dogma' will no longer have religious connotations in two hundred years.

15. Using maximality in the semantics of definites goes back to Sharvy (1980). Maximality is especially apt to cope with plural definites.

This is a referential approach to definite descriptions in opposition to a quantifier approach. The adequate analysis of definite descriptions is still an unsolved topic since the time of Frege and Russell, with linguists nowadays leaning towards a referential approach (see, e.g., Heim and Kratzer 1998) and philosophers to a quantifier approach (see, e.g., Neale 1990).

Syntactically, I assume that noun phrases are DPs (cf. (11)) and that, as for noun phrases which visibly only contain a pure quotation, the description operator is the meaning of a determiner in syntax which has no counterpart in the phonetic structure of the sentence, i.e., an empty determiner ([D $\emptyset$] in (11d)). Thus, in the sentence *'Dogma' is a noun of Greek and Latin origin* the quotation syntactically is a DP (with an empty D and with *'dogma'* being a noun) and semantically a definite description (*the x which has the shape <dogma>*) denoting the maximal, most salient thing which has the shape <dogma>. As far as I can see, the predicate view of pure quotation is compatible with each of the uses of pure quotations at which we have been looking.

What can a pure-quotation DP refer to? It can refer to things which have a certain shape, a shape which can be presented by graphical or phonetic or – as far as sign languages are concerned – gestural means. First and foremost, such DPs refer to various kinds of linguistic entities: to linguistic types as letters, sounds, chains of letters or sounds, word-forms, lexems, phrases, etc., and to linguistic tokens of various kinds. In (30), the quotation DPs refer to or quantify on concrete linguistic entities in space and time – take a situation where a handwritten letter is in focus.

(30)   a.   No 't' resembles the other ones.
        b.   Compare the first 't' with the second one.

In (31), a certain chain of letters is referred to, i.e., a certain linguistic type.

(31)   'Red' is a sign that articulates one word in English and a different word in Norwegian. (Cappelen and Lepore 2007: 149)

In (32a), a word-form, and in (32b), a lexem is denoted:

(32)   a.   'Laughed' is a past-tense form.
        b.   'Laugh' is a verb with regular inflection.
            (Vs. *'Laughed' is a verb with regular inflection.)

To summarize, there is a certain vagueness in what pure-quotation DPs refer to (or quantify on) despite the fact that pure-quotation predicates have a definite meaning (»having a certain shape«). This vagueness is resolved by the context which comes into play by the meaning of the description operator »the maximal

most salient thing which satisfies the predicate«. (See § 6 below on what pure quotations do *not* denote.)

We have already seen that there are striking syntactic and semantic similarities between pure quotations and proper nouns. A quotational account of proper names is especially apt to explain these facts. In one version of such an account, proper names like *N* or *the N* are analyzed as rigid definite descriptions of the form »the most salient x which carries the name N« (Karnowski and Pafel 2005). The proper name *Quine*, for instance, gets the meaning »the most salient x which is called Quine«. The proper noun *Quine* is thus a predicate which applies to everything that is called Quine or carries the name *Quine*. In exactly the same way as pure quotations, proper nouns refer to their own shape: the semantic description of a proper noun's lexical entry contains the structure »predicate(x,α)« with α being identical to the graphical or phonetic description of the proper noun (this structure gets the interpretation »x is called α«).

5.   On coreference, binding and quantifying-in in quotation

Before we can ask how well the predicate view fares with respect to the diverse adequacy conditions on theories of quotation which have been set up in the literature, it is necessary to look at coreference, binding and quantifying-in in quotation from the perspective of the predicate view.

Despite the fact that the meaning of a pure quotation is no function of the meaning of the quoted material, the quoted material can make an entity salient that is referred to by elements outside of the quotation. (33a), for instance, can easily have a reading where the pronoun *sie* refers to Angela Merkel (cf. the examples in Partee 1973: 412, 417).[16]

(33)   a.   Der Satz 'Angela Merkel ist Bundeskanzlerin und Parteivorsitzen-
de' ist wahr, wenn sie beide Ämter inne hat.
'The sentence 'Angela Merkel is chancelor and party leader' is
true if she has both positions.'

b.   Angela Merkel$_i$ ist Bundeskanzlerin und Parteivorsitzende, wenn
sie$_i$ beide Ämter inne hat.
'Angela Merkel is chancelor and party leader if she has both po-
sitions.'

---

16. Cappelen and Lepore (2007) base their argument that direct quotations are sentences, not NPs, on similar considerations. As these considerations relate to direct and pure quotations alike, their argument concerning the sentential status of direct quotations cannot be convincing.

Nevertheless, pure quotations are syntacto-semantic islands insofar as there are no systematic syntactic or semantic relations between the quoted material and the linguistic context of the pure quotation. There is, for instance, no binding relation in (33a) between *Angela Merkel* and the pronoun – whereas there is one in (33b). This is confirmed by the fact that quantifier binding is possible in (34b), but impossible in (34a): the quantifier cannot bind outside the scope of the quotation, i.e., (34a) cannot have the same reading as (34b).

(34)   a.   *Der Satz 'Jeder$_i$ ist Bundeskanzler und Parteivorsitzender' ist
wahr, wenn er$_i$ beide Ämter inne hat.[17]
'The sentence *Everyone$_i$ is chancelor and party leader* is true if
he$_i$ has both positions.'

b.   Jeder$_i$ ist Bundeskanzler und Parteivorsitzender, wenn er$_i$ beide
Ämter inne hat.
'Everyone$_i$ is chancelor and party leader if he$_i$ has both positions.'

Compare the (im)possibility of reflexive binding in (35) (p.c. Markus Stein-
bach):

(35)   a.   *'Angela Merkel$_i$' ist ein Eigenname und von sich$_i$ überzeugt.
'*Angela Merkel* is a proper name and convinced of herself.'

b.   Angela Merkel$_i$ ist Bundeskanzlerin und von sich$_i$ überzeugt.
'Angela Merkel is chancelor and convinced of herself.'

The island character of pure quotations is confirmed by the absence of certain principle C violations. Coreference between the pronoun and *Angela Merkel* is possible in (36a), but not in (36b).

(36)   a.   Sie hat, wenn der Satz 'Angela Merkel ist Bundeskanzlerin und
Parteivorsitzende' wahr ist, beide Ämter inne.

---

17. It doesn't seem to me that the sentence improves at all when the pronoun *er* is sub-
stituted by *der*, *dieser* or *diese Person* 'this one', 'this person'. Even if it would
improve, this would not be evidence for a binding relation as (ii) shows.
(i)   *Der Satz 'Jeder ist Bundeskanzler und Parteivorsitzender' ist wahr,
wenn der (/dieser, diese Person) beide Ämter inne hat.
'The sentence *Everyone is chancelor and party leader* is true if this one
(/this person) has both positions.'
(ii)   Jeder$_i$ ist Bundeskanzler und Parteivorsitzender, wenn *der$_i$ (*dieser$_i$,
??diese Person$_i$) beide Ämter inne hat.
'The sentence *Everyone$_i$ is chancelor and party leader* is true if this one$_i$
(/this person$_i$) has both positions.'

'She has both positions if the sentence *Angela Merkel is chancelor and party leader* is true.'

    b.   *Sie$_i$ hat, wenn Angela Merkel$_i$ Bundeskanzlerin und Parteivorsitzende ist, beide Ämter inne.
'She has both positions if Angela Merkel is chancelor and party leader.'

With respect to coreference and binding, pure, direct and mixed quotation behave similarly: The quoted material in direct and mixed quotes is semantically active in the same way as in pure quotations – the original examples in Partee (1973: 412, 417) were all cases of direct quotation.

(37)   a.   Auf dem Schild steht "Hier hat Goethe genächtigt", obwohl er dort nur den Abend verbracht hat.
'One can read on the sign "Goethe spent a night here", although he only spent an evening there.'

    b.   Auf dem Schild steht, dass in diesem Haus »Goethe genächtigt« habe, obwohl er dort nur den Abend verbracht hat.
'One can read on the sign that in this house »Goethe spent a night«, although he only spent an evening there.'

Certain principle C violations do not exist in direct and mixed quotations either – in (38) *sie* 'she' can refer to Angela Merkel:

(38)   a.   Sie weiß, dass er gesagt hat "Die Merkel ist unfähig".
'She knows that he has said "Merkel is inept".'

    b.   Sie weiß, dass er gesagt hat, dass »die Merkel unfähig« sei.
'She knows that he has said that »Merkel is inept«.'

There are two candidates for quantifying into quotation. The first candidate is quantifier binding into direct quotation (cf. Johnson 2007):

(39)   a.   Er hat bei jedem Bewerber gesagt "Den halte ich für unfähig".
'He said of every candidate "I take him to be inept".'

    b.   Jedesmal, wenn er jemanden Neues trifft, sagt er ihm: "Du erinnerst mich an meinen Bruder".
'Every time he makes a new acquaintance, he tells him: "You remind me of my brother".'

It depends on crucial details of the semantic analysis whether these might be true cases of quantifying into quotation with *den* in (39a) and *du* in (39b) being bound variables. According to the analysis of direct quotation I will present

in § 7, these sentences won't exemplify quantifying into quotation (see footnote 25). The second candidate for quantifying into quotation is certain cases of metalinguistic quantification:

(40)   a.   Ich hasse Aussagen der Form 'Etwas muss so und so und nicht anders sein'.
'I hate statements of the form *Something must be such and such and can't be another way.*'

    b.   Ich hasse Aussagen wie 'Das und das muss so und so und nicht anders sein'.
'I hate statements like *This or that must be such and such and can't be another way.*'

The statements referred to in these two sentences are statements of the form 'δ must be ϕ and can't be another way'. Thus, the expressions *etwas* ('something'), *das und das* ('this or that') and *so und so* ('such and such'), which occur inside the quotation, are mere place-holders for linguistic material. This looks like quantifying into quotation as the following clumsy paraphrase of (40) exhibits: »I hate statements x which are such that there is an δ and a ϕ such that x has the shape <δ muss ϕ und nicht anders sein>« Thus, the pure quotation 'Etwas muss so und so und nicht anders sein' has the meaning

(41) $\lambda x[\exists\delta\exists\phi\ \textbf{Shape}(x,<\delta$ muss ϕ und nicht anders sein$>)]$

But even these examples of metalinguistic quantification need not be taken as true cases of quantifying into quotation. In the semantic description of a pure-quote noun according to the predicate view in § 4, the second argument of the predicate is an expression denoting a chain of phonetic or graphical elements (α in the templates (28) and (29)) – an expression taken from the phonetic/graphical description of the pure-quote noun. The sentences being discussed make it necessary to assume quantifiers which range on phonetic or graphical elements and bind into the second argument of the predicate.[18] However, this is not really quantifying into quotation, as in the semantic description

---

18. Recently, Sudo (2008) presented a semantics for existential quantification into quotation. It seems that quantifiers introduced by this kind of metalinguistic quantification have the smallest possible scope with respect to quantifiers and negation (*pace* Sudo).

    (i)   He has never given a statement of the form *Something must be such and such and can't be another way.*

    (ii)   He hasn't given a statement of the form *Something must be such and such and can't* be another way.

there are no quotations, but a special vocabulary for phonetic/graphical elements.

These cases of metalinguistic quantification indicate, however, that the variable-sharing between the phonetic/graphical and the semantic description, which is an essential aspect of the predicate view in § 4, might be too simple of a procedure to account for all kinds of pure quotation. It seems to work in many, perhaps most, cases, but not in certain cases of metalinguistic quantification. To cope with them in a predicate view of pure quotation, the semantic description in the lexical entry for the pure-quotation template has to be supplemented by a function f which takes the phonetic/graphical description as an argument:

(42)   predicate(x,f(α))

In the most frequent case, the function maps a phonetic/graphical description onto itself. In metalinguistic quantification, however, it inserts variables and quantifiers on phonetic/graphical elements, i.e., if there are occurrences of expressions like *so und so*, *das oder das* or *etwas* in α, the function f can map α onto α' with α' being identical to α except that occurrences of the before-mentioned expressions are substituted by variables on phonetic/graphical elements and that existential quantifiers are introduced which bind these variables.[19]

In English and German, place-holders occur in direct quotation also – see the following passage from Robert Musil's *Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (begin of chapter 4), where *dies oder das* functions as a place-holder for linguistic material:

(43)   [Wenn es aber Wirklichkeitssinn gibt, und niemand wird bezweifeln, daß er seine Daseinsberechtigung hat, dann muß es auch etwas geben, das man Möglichkeitssinn nennen kann.] Wer ihn besitzt, sagt beispielsweise nicht: Hier ist dies oder das gesehen, wird geschehen, muß geschehen.[20]

There is a convention in quoting to indicate unquoted material inside of quoted material. I could, for instance, quote the statement 'Quine, who died in 2000,

---

19. In the system of my 2005 the existential quantifiers are put into the quantifier store of α' and are assigned features (A-WEAK, R-WEAK) which make the quantifiers receive the smallest absolute and relative scope (cf. footnote 18).

20. Translation: "But if there is a sense of reality, and nobody will doubt that it has every right to exist, then there must be something in addition which one could call sense of possibility. He who owns it would, for instance, not say: This or that did happen, will happen, must happen here."

is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century' by omitting the relative clause as in (44):

(44)   He wrote, "Quine [...] is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century".

This sign for omission in quotation is a further place-holder for linguistic material and occurs in mixed quotation too: *John said that you are an »... idiot«* (with '...' being a place-holder for, for instance, *fucking*); *Er hat wörtlich gesagt, dass du »ein A...loch« wärst* ('He literally said that you are »an a...hole«').

To cope with metalinguistic quantification, there was no need to refer to substitutional quantification – it is objectual existential quantification on graphical or phonetic elements that we made use of. Brendel (2007: § 4) argues that substitutional quantification is necessary to capture what is special about sentences of the type *'Pentasyllabic' is pentasyllabic*. In (45) the quoted 'F' should be interpreted as a substitutional variable bound by a substitutional existential quantifier:

(45)   There are (property expressions) F such that 'F' is (/has the property) F.

We can, however, capture what is special about this type of sentences without substitutional quantification:

(46)   There are (property expressions) F such that F has the property which F denotes.

'Pentasyllabic' has the property which 'pentasyllabic' denotes is a true instantiation of (46) and entails *'Pentasyllabic' is pentasyllabic* – presupposing the disquotational schema »Something has the property which 'F' denotes iff it is F«.

In contrast to their syntactic behaviour we looked at in §§ 2 and 3, we could observe in this paragraph that pure quotation, on the one hand, and direct and mixed quotation, on the other, behave very similarly with respect to coreference, binding and metalinguistic quantification.

6.   The adequacy of the predicate view

The predicate view of pure quotations satisfies many of the adequacy conditions for quotation accounts that have been set up in the literature (cf. Saka 1998: § 6, Harth 2002: § I.5, Steinbrenner 2004: 96f., Cappelen and Lepore 2007: § 3, Harth 2007: § 4). The predicate view, to begin with, makes it possible to explain

that understanding the mechanisms of quotation requires mastering a capacity to understand and generate a potential infinity of new quotations. In the predicate view, the competence in understanding and generating pure quotations consists essentially in possessing lexical templates like (28) and (29), which allow arbitrarily many uses.

The predicate view is compatible with the fact that pure quotations can be used to introduce novel words, symbols and alphabets – but it must be presupposed that the graphical/phonetic description in (28) or (29) is rich enough to represent shapes of arbitrary form. Quotation is iterable: with (28), *'dogma'* as well as *' 'dogma' '* can be generated, the first one on the basis of *dogma* and the second one on the basis of *'dogma'*. The two quotations differ in meaning: *'dogma'* means »x has shape <dogma>« and *' 'dogma' '* means »x has shape <'dogma'>«.

Quotation marks are not an essential element of quotation in the predicate view, see the template (29).

The predicate view explains the opacity of pure quotations, i.e., the fact that in quotations neither coextensive nor synonymous expressions can generally be substituted for one another *salva veritate*. As two coextensive or synonymous expressions necessarily differ in shape, the pure quotations of two such expressions differ in meaning according to the predicate view and, thus, cannot generally be substituted for one another *salva veritate*. Let's assume that *bachelor* and *unmarried man* are coextensive. Then (47) is true, but (48) is false as the predicates *having the shape <bachelor>* and *having the shape <unmarried man>* are not coextensive.

(47)   *Bachelor* and *unmarried man* are coextensive.
(48)   *'Bachelor'* and *'unmarried man'* are coextensive.

Yet the fact that pure quotations are opaque does not preclude that the quoted material has a meaning. The quoted material can, as we have seen in § 5, make an entity salient that is referred to by elements outside of the quotation.

Ordinary objectual quantification into pure quotation is impossible and the predicate view of pure quotation is fully compatible with this fact. *Chomsky is a famous linguist and a well-known political writer* entails *There is someone such that he is a famous linguist and a well-known political writer*. However, *'Chomsky' is a proper name* does not entail something like *There is someone such that 'he' is a proper name* (which in itself is not a comprehensible well-formed sentence due to the vacuous quantification). We have already seen that in diverse forms of quotation, metalinguistic quantification is possible and can be conceived as objectual quantification on linguistic entities.

The picture-like character of pure quotation ("a quotation somehow pictures what it is about" Davidson 1979 [1984: 83]) is accounted for by the pure quotation's semantics which makes reference to its shape.

It is sometimes claimed that pure quotations are ›flexible‹ in the sense of being ambiguous to a high degree (see Saka 1998, Hart 2002, 2007). It is claimed that a pure-quotation DP can denote very different things depending on the predicate it is combined with. We have already seen in § 5 that pure-quotation DPs can denote various kinds of linguistic types and tokens. However, the influence of the predicate should not be exaggerated. With respect to (49a), for example, one might argue that the quotation does not denote a word form which has phonological, morphological, syntactic and semantic properties, but a sequence of phonemes only as the predicate features a phonological concept. Such a move is unnecessary. There are clear cases where the quotation refers to a word form (see (49c), where various linguistic properties are predicated of what is denoted by the pure quotation), and reference to word form is possible, perhaps even mandatory in (49a) if we consider the continuation in (49b).

(49)   a.   'Runs' contains four phonemes.
        b.   'Runs' contains four phonemes and it is a verb in the third person singular.
        c.   'Runs' and 'rennt' are similiar with respect to the fact that they contain four phonemes, are verbs in the third person singular and denote a certain kind of bodily movement.

Even if a predicate features semantic aspects, a pure-quotation DP denotes a linguistic entity and not the meaning of the linguistic entity. See (50), where we obviously refer to words or lexems, not to meanings: (*Samstag* is the German translation of *saturday*)

(50)   a.   'Saturday' and 'Samstag' are synonymous.
        b.   The nouns 'Saturday' and 'Samstag' are synonymous.
        c.   *The day that 'Saturday' denotes and the day that 'Samstag' denotes are synonymous.

When the linguist states *The concept 'Saturday' is the concept 'Samstag'*, he makes use of a metonymic way of speaking: "The concept that 'Saturday' denotes is identical to the concept that 'Samstag' denotes.«

7.   A propositional view on direct quotation

With respect to coreference, binding and metalinguistic quantification, pure, direct and mixed quotation behave very similarly. With respect to syntax, pure, direct and mixed quotation differ in a significant manner. Pure quotations are nouns, direct quotations sentences, and mixed quotations constituents and non-constituents of various types. It would come as a surprise if these syntactic differences should not have semantic consequences. If pure quotations are predicates, as nouns usually are, it is not probable that pure and direct quotations are semantically on a par with each other. Expressions of the sentence type usually are not predicates. Thus, the semantic part of the second dogma is very doubtful too. Nevertheless, the assumption (being a conclusion of the two dogmas) that direct quotes are noun phrases and singular terms denoting linguistic expressions might be true with respect to its semantic part, as it seems obvious that direct quotations denote linguistic expressions. Thus, pure quotation and direct quotation seem to have at least something in common, namely that direct quotes as well as noun phrases which visibly only contain a pure quotation denote linguistic expressions.

Even this is not as obviously true as one is tempted to think. Two related facts point into this direction. Firstly, if you want to translate *'It rains' is an English sentence* into German, you should not translate the pure quotation, otherwise you would get a false sentence as the translation of a true one (*'Es regnet' ist ein englischer Satz*). Even if the translation would not get a false sentence (as, e.g., the translation of *'It rains' consists of two words* as *'Es regnet' besteht aus zwei Worten*), it would not be faithful to what the sentence actually means. With direct quotations, we do not find this strict dependence on the quoted expressions. With direct quotations, it is possible and quite natural to translate the quotation together with the other parts of the speech report – see, e.g., *Heine said, "I like Moritz most"* as a translation of *Heine hat gesagt "Moritz ist mir der liebste"*. Reading the English sentence in an English biography on the German poet Heinrich Heine, one would not be inclined to think that Heine made his remark in English. You can observe this phenomenon in nearly every edition of a newspaper which reports on foreign affairs.[21] Secondly, as for pure quo-

tation, it is possible to insert linguistic material from a distinct language into a sentence without getting code mixing or code switching (see, e.g., *'Es regnet' is a well-formed German sentence*). With direct quotation, we seem to get a mix or switch (*Heine said, "Moritz ist mir der liebste"*).

Thus, it is questionable whether direct quotations really behave like singular terms that denote linguistic types or tokens. As direct quotations are sentences, it is actually near at hand to assume that they have the same type of denotation as ordinary *that* sentences, that is, that they denote propositions. They might additionally refer to linguistic entities, but basically, they have a propositional content – as *that* clauses and indirect quotations do.[22] This (surprising) conclusion is supported by the fact that direct quotes can be used in attitude contexts (*Heine thought "I like Moritz most"*) – it is thus no longer necessary to claim that this is a metaphorical use of direct quotation – and by coordination data like the following, where a direct quote is coordinated with a *that* clause:

(51)   Philosophiestudenten in aller Welt lernen: "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen". Und dass er ein kubistisches Haus baute, das Palais Wittgenstein in Wien. (*Die Zeit*, 24 july 2008, page 13)[23]

One way to implement such a propositional view on direct quotation is to analyze a speech report like *S said "..."* as follows:

(52)   S said that p, with p being the propositions denoted by the sentence '...' if '...' is uttered in context C.

The direct quotation "..." itself can be analyzed as a definite description:[24]

---

21. Compare Cappelen and Lepore (2007: §5) on ›impure direct quotes‹, i.e., quotes which are translated and quotes which are fixed up ("omitted words filled in, grammatical infelicities repaired, repeated words eliminated, utterances of 'hmm', 'aahh', etc. eliminated"). Contrary to Cappelen and Lepore, I think that these phenomena have a »bearing on how we think about the semantics of quotation« (ibid. § 5.3), as they are evidence for a propositional view of direct quotation.

22. The influential scepticism towards propositions, partially fueled by behavoristic inclinations, might be the reason that the propositional view is not an investigated option in the analysis of direct quotation. Confronted with the varieties of embedded clauses, the sceptic takes direct quotation as the obvious point of departure with apparently no commitment to propositions, views indirect quotation with direct quotation in mind and tries to get a grip on content clauses in attitude sentences with indirect quotation in mind (cf. Falkenberg 1998: § 11).

23. Translation: "Students of philosophy all over the world learn "One should be silent about what one cannot speak". And that he built a cubist house, the Palais Wittgenstein in Vienna."

24. Direct and indirect quotations are thus two different kinds of descriptions of propositions. (In my 1999 I have shown how the similiarities and differences between several kinds of declarative and interrogative clauses can be accounted for if we take them to be different kinds of definite descriptions of propositions.) The further development

(53)   ιp[p are the propositions denoted by '…' if '…' is uttered in context C]

The locution 'uttered in context C' might be cashed out as: 'uttered by speaker S to addressee A at time T and location L with respect to salient entities E'.[25]

In direct quotation, indexicals are shifted: A token of the indexical I which is part of a direct quotation embedded in a speech report, for instance, does not refer to the one who utters the token, i.e., to the speech reporter, but to the person whose speech is reported. This indexical shift, which is an essential feature of direct quotation, is the consequence of the context-shift built into the semantics of direct quotation.

Quite similar to pure quotation, direct quotation can be captured in a lexicalist way:

(54)   Lexical template for direct quotation
PHON/   ⁕α⁰
GRAPH   with (i) α being a phonetic or graphical entity and
         (ii) with ⁕ and ⁰ staying for ' resp. ', " resp. ", » resp. «,
         › resp. ‹, " resp. " or similiar things or being empty
SYN   S
SEM   ιp[p are the propositions denoted by f(α) if it is uttered in context C]

Identical to the template for pure quotation, there is structure sharing between the phonetic/graphical and the semantic description in form of the variable α. It is this aspect which might be common to all kinds of quotation and might explain why pure quotation and the other kinds of quotation behave very similarly with respect to coreference, binding and metalinguistic quantification. Mixed

---

of the propositional view should, of course, elucidate what exactly the ›propositions‹ are that are denoted by direct quotations, as not only statements, but also questions, commands, exclamations etc. can be directly quoted. The fact that direct quotations can be more sensitive to the actual wording of the original utterance than indirect quotations is, I suppose, a fact which should be accounted for by pragmatic means of a familiar Gricean sort ("if someone uses direct instead of indirect quotation, one is entitled to assume that he is faithful to the original utterance").

25. A sentence like *He said of every candidate "I take him to be inept"* (cf. (39a)) could now be analyzed along the following lines:
    With respect to every candidate₂ he₁ uttered assertively the proposition that is denoted by 'I take him to be inept' if it is uttered by speaker S₁ to addressee A at time T and location L with respect to the salient entity X₂.
    According to this analysis, there is no quantification into quotation in such a sentence.

---

quotation must resemble direct quotation to some extent, as there can be indexical shift in mixed quotation too (see Cumming 2005, Cappelen and Lepore 2007: 29f.). In scare quoting we have structure sharing as well if, in a sentence like (55a), we analyze the noun phrase containing the scare quotation semantically as (55b):

(55)   a.   He invited the ›best actress in the world‹.
        b.   the x which is called 'best actress in the world' by B

The meaning of a scare quote can be described as λx[x is called f(α) by B] with α being the phonetic/graphical description of the linguistic material in between the quotation marks.

8.   Beyond the two dogmas

There is ample evidence that throws doubt on the first dogma of quotation, i.e., the assumption that pure quotations are noun phrases and singular terms which denote linguistic expressions. With the evidence presented, it seems obvious that pure quotations are nouns. The predicate view of pure quotations is at least a very natural consequence of the view of pure quotations as nouns. As for the second dogma, i.e., the assumption that pure and direct quotation are more less on a par with each other syntactically and semantically, we have clearly seen that pure quotation and direct quotation differ in a significant manner in syntax. Pure quotations are nouns, while direct quotations are sentences. It does not come as a surprise that they differ semantically too. These differences paved the way to the propositional view of direct quotation. Although I stressed the differences between the kinds of quotation throughout this essay, we can see, nevertheless, that the different uses of quotation marks we looked at constitute a family of uses which resemble each other, that quotation marks are a case of polysemy.

References

Bach, Kent
    2002   Giorgione was so-called because of his name. *Philosophical Perspectives* 16: 73–103.

Brendel, Elke
    2007   Zitat und Selbstbezug. In *Zitat und Bedeutung*, E. Brendel, J. Meibauer and M. Steinbach (eds.), 27–43. Hamburg: Buske.

Brendel, Elke, Jörg Meibauer and Markus Steinbach (eds.)
  2007   *Zitat und Bedeutung*. Hamburg: Buske. [= Linguistische Berichte,
                Sonderheft 15]

Burge, Tyler
  1973   Reference and proper names. *Journal of Philosophy* 70: 553–576.

Cappelen, Herman and Ernie Lepore
  2005   Varieties of quotation revisited. In *Hybrid quotations*, P. de Brabanter
                (ed.), 51–75. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Cappelen, Herman and Ernie Lepore
  2007   *Language turned on itself. The semantics and pragmatics of meta-
                linguistic discourse.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Herbert H. and Richard J. Gerrig
  1990   Quotations as demonstrations. *Language* 66: 764–805.

Cumming, Samuel
  2005   Two accounts of indexicals in mixed quotation. In *Hybrid quotations*,
                P. de Brabanter (ed.), 77–88. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

De Brabanter, Philippe (ed.)
  2005   *Hybrid quotations*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. [=Belgian Journal of Lin-
                guistics 17, 2003].

De Bruyn, Günter
  2006   *Als Poesie gut. Schicksale aus Berlins Kunstepoche 1786 bis 1807.*
                Frankfurt/M.: Fischer.

Davidson, Donald
  1979   Quotations. *Theory and Decision 11*: 27–40. (Reprinted in: D. David-
                son (ed.), *Essays on truth and interpretation*, 79–92. Oxford: Claren-
                don 1984.)

Elugardo, Reinaldo
  2002   The predicate view of proper names. In *Logical form and language*,
                G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), 467–503. Oxford: Clarendon.

Falkenberg, Gabriel
  1998   *Sinn, Bedeutung, Intensionalität. Der Fregesche Weg.* Tübingen:
                Mohr Siebeck.

Frege, Gottlob
  1892   Über Sinn und Bedeutung. *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophi-
                sche Kritik*, C: 25–50.

Gómez-Torrente, Mario
  2005   Remarks on impure quotation. In *Hybrid quotations*, P. de Brabanter
                (ed.), 129–151. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Harth, Manfred
  2002   *Anführung. Ein nicht-sprachliches Mittel der Sprache.* Paderborn:
                Mentis.

Harth, Manfred
  2007   Die logische Form von Anführungssätzen. In: *Zitat und Bedeutung*,
                E. Brendel, J. Meibauer and M. Steinbach (eds.), 135–151. Hamburg:
                Buske.

Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer
  1998   *Semantics in generative grammar*. Malden: Blackwell.

Johnson, Michael
  2007   The punctuation theory of quotation (or something like it). Paper pre-
                sented at the 'First International Conference on Quotation and Mean-
                ing', 20 October 2007, Mainz.

Kaplan, David
  1989   Afterthoughts. In *Themes from Kaplan*, J. Almog et al. (eds.), 567–
                614. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Karnowski, Pawel and Jürgen Pafel
  2005   Wie anders sind Eigennamen? *Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft* 24:
                45–66.

Katz, Jerrold J.
  2001   The end of millianism: Multiple bearers, improper names, and com-
                positional meaning. *Journal of Philosophy* 98: 137–166.

Larson, Richard and Gabriel Segal
  1995   *Knowledge of meaning: an introduction to semantic theory.* Cam-
                bridge, MA: MIT Press.

Meibauer, Jörg
  2003   Phrasenkomposita zwischen Wortsyntax und Lexikon. *Zeitschrift für
                Sprachwissenschaft* 22: 153–188.

Meinunger, André
  2000   *Syntactic aspects of topic and comment.* Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Müller, Stefan
  2008   *Head-driven phrase structure grammar. Eine Einführung.* Tübingen:
                Stauffenburg.

Neale, Stephen
  1990   *Descriptions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pafel, Jürgen
  1999   Interrogative quantifiers within scope. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 22:
                255–310.

Pafel, Jürgen
  2005   *Quantifier scope in German.* Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Pafel, Jürgen
  2007   Ein Essay mit dem Titel *On pure quotation*. In *Zitat und Bedeutung*,
              E. Brendel, J. Meibauer and M. Steinbach (eds.), 201–214. Hamburg:
              Buske.

Partee, Barbara Hall
  1973   The syntax and semantics of quotation. In *A Festschrift for Morris
              Halle*, S.R. Anderson and P. Kiparsky (eds.), 410–418. New York:
              Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Pollard, Carl and Ivan A. Sag
  1994   *Head-driven phrase structure grammar*. Chicago: The University of
              Chicago Press.

Quine, Willard van Orman
  1960   *Word and object*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Recanati, François
  2001   Open quotation. *Mind* 110: 637–687.

Saka, Paul
  1998   Quotations and the use-mention distinction. *Mind* 107: 113–135.

Sharvy, Richard
  1980   A more general theory of definite descriptions. *The Philosophical Re-
              view* 89: 607–624.

Steinbrenner, Jakob
  2004   *Zeichen über Zeichen. Grundlagen einer Theorie der Metabezug-
              nahme*. Heidelberg: Synchron.

Sudo, Yasutada
  2008   Quantification into quotations: evidence from Japanese wh-doublets.
              In *Proceedings of SuB12*, A. Grønn (ed.), 613–627. Oslo: ILOS.

Webelhuth, Gerd
  1992   *Principles and parameters of syntactic saturation*. New York: Oxford
              University Press.

Reporting and Quoting in Signed Discourse*

Josep Quer

1.   Introduction

The linguistic resources displayed by sign languages (SLs) in order to reproduce or recreate someone else's utterances or thoughts have remained absent from the syntactic and semantic research on reported discourse and quotation till very recently. This paper aims at contributing some fresh SL data to the discussion about the proper characterization of reported discourse contexts and to analyze some of their peculiarities within the broader perspective of (in)direct reports. Despite the apparent differences at the surface, it will be argued that the core distinctions of reported structures in signed discourse coincide with the ones we find across spoken languages.

I will describe the formal mechanisms distinguishing direct and indirect discourse in the signed modality. Special attention will be devoted to the behaviour of indexicals in shifted contexts. I will defend and refine a unified treatment of quotational and non-quotational use of role shift in SLs, in line with Zucchi (2004) and other previous research. An analysis will be offered where a covert Point of View Operator will be posited and held responsible for the morphological and semantic properties of role shift constructions. One partial conclusion will be that the crosslinguistic validity of the "Shift-Together Constraint" for indexicals by Anand & Nevins (2004) might not be instantiated in the SLs examined.